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Shaping corporate reform: social enterprise, cooperatives, mission-
led and employee-owned business 
Nina Boeger, University of Bristol Law School 
Introduction  
Many of the most serious challenges we face today, including climate change threats, mass 
migration and major levels of income and wealth inequality, have been linked to the activities of 
business corporations. The involvement of large multinationals in resource depletion, social and 
economic exploitation and other corporate scandals has created suspicion and distrust. And despite 
attempts by corporate actors to ensure, or at least to give an impression of, better behaviour, there 
has grown widespread scepticism towards corporate social responsibility (CSR) and towards well-
established corporate norms such as shareholder primacy. The resulting legitimacy crisis of 
corporations arises in part out of the financial nature of shareholdings, where shares are held as part 
of an investment portfolio, and shareholders are distant from the corporation but focus instead on 
maximising their return on investment. In addition, central to these financialised structures, 
executives appear to have abandoned their fiduciary duties to the corporation and focus instead on 
extracting value for investors and for themselves.  
By prioritising short term, profit oriented goals rather than long term objectives that comprise a 
broader set of aims, company directors manage corporations above all with a view to maximising 
value for their shareholders; even if doing so means impacting negatively, directly or indirectly, on 
other stakeholders, both those inside the corporation (employees) and those external to it 
(consumers, suppliers, communities, taxpayers, the environment). These externalities remain largely 
unaccounted for (they are not internalised) unless regulatory intervention leads corporations to 
modify their behaviour. But corporate power and influence extends to the political decision-making 
that determines these regulations. Corporations lobby extensively and they fund political activism. 
Their investments in our economies grant them access to, and power over, our governments and 
political decision-makers. They invest, too, in controlling our societies: shaping our knowledge, 
understanding and perceptions, such as what we consider a “normal” business, and our workplace, 
to look like; how we measure wealth, success and social justice; how seriously we take our health 
and a healthy environment, and so on.  
In short, corporations take on few responsibilities except towards their shareholders, but they have 
vast social, economic and political influence over everyone else too. That is what, currently, makes 
them so problematic. In this chapter, I will set out briefly why these concerns have led a number of 
commentators to suggest that radical reform of the corporate form is necessary to address its 
current failures as well as the extensive power it has accumulated. I will then turn to discussing some 
existing, and emerging, alternative forms of the business enterprise and ask what these forms, and 
the great diversity of organisations they represent, may be able to contribute to the critical debate 
over reforming the governance of our corporations. These alternative business forms operate mostly 
in the “interstices” of the mainstream capitalist model, servicing distinct and often localised niche 
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markets, though with notable exceptions.1 But this chapter argues that they include many examples 
of socially responsible organising that could translate into possibilities for wider corporate 
governance reform. In this way, the chapter discusses the development of social enterprises, 
cooperatives, mission-led, and employee-owned businesses in the United Kingdom, and asks 
whether we may look to these models to find inspiration for radical corporate reform. The final 
section briefly considers whether the motivational strength of these forms, namely their reliance on 
strong entrepreneurial figures prepared to use business as a vehicle for social activism, may at the 
same time constitute one of their potential pitfalls: perhaps we should beware the glorification of 
the activist entrepreneur? 
The case for corporate reform 
Corporate governance reform has been a widely discussed issue following the global economic crisis 
of 2008. In response to the crisis, governments and policymakers have at least paid lip service to the 
idea that corporations should be more strictly held accountable for their actions, and they have 
introduced additional governance requirements to avoid such crises in the future. However, most of 
these responses have not been effective. As Paddy Ireland observes, the frequency and sheer scale 
of the corporate scandals emerging in most recent times suggests instead that ‘corporate 
irresponsibility does seem to be scaling new heights’.2 Among other things, this reflects a lack of 
meaningful corporate governance reforms, despite governments’ concerted efforts to convey a 
public message that they are taking issue of corporate accountability (more) seriously.  
The reason for why these responses have remained, by and large, inadequate and ineffectual, lies in 
the corporation itself and in its political power. Corporate law and the regulation of corporate 
governance have been shaped, perhaps more than any other regulatory domain, by the political 
influence of large corporations over regulatory processes. Instead of introducing systemic changes to 
corporate governance rules that would be mandated, what we have seen in the aftermath of the 
crisis are essentially the “same old same old” market-led responses to corporate failure. These 
feature plenty of discussion around corporate social responsibility, sustainability and stakeholder 
responsibilities, but the reality is that few, if any, of the additional reforms introduced over the last 
ten years (including attempts to achieve more independent non-executive directors and auditors, 
more transparency and disclosure requirements but also a reduction of “red tape”) mandate 
systemic changes to corporate structure and organisation. Nor have they proven especially impactful 
or fundamental. On the contrary, by focusing on the role of shareholders to hold company directors 
to account so as to improve corporate transparency, some of these reforms have further reinforced 
the primacy of shareholders in the governance of the corporation.   
The intellectual climate around corporate governance reform however is, as Ireland reminds us, 
more and more critical of the status quo. A rising number of academics, popular political 
commentators, but also leaders in the business world, are beginning to seriously question the 
neoliberal ideology that has underpinned corporate governance from the 1990s onwards, the idea 
that shareholder value should be so central to what corporations are for and how they are run. But, 
                                                          
1  See only the employee-owned John Lewis partnership or Cooperative retailer in the UK, or the Mondragon 
cooperative consortium based in the Spanish Basque region. 
2 Paddy Ireland, ‘Corporate Schizophrenia: the institutional origins of corporate social irresponsibility’, in Nina 
Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and 
enterprise diversity, Oxford: Hard Publishing, 2017, forthcoming. 
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although many of these critical commentators challenge the idea of shareholder value maximisation 
and short-termism, few go further and propose a more fundamental revision of the shareholder 
primacy norm itself. According to Ireland: 
‘These critiques do not, however, generally entail a rejection of shareholder primacy. On the 
contrary, their goal is usually to get managers to purpose shareholder value in a more 
‘enlightened’ manner and to focus on long- rather than short-term financial returns. Many of 
the reform proposals that have emerged thus seek to get shareholders to act more like 
‘proper’, active, committed ‘owners’…. and to persuade managers to adopt the role of 
‘stewards’.’3 
Ireland’s argument on the other hand is that in a context where most shares are held by distant 
shareholders as part of a portfolio of financial investments, getting these financiers to act more like 
responsible ‘owners’ of the corporation is a struggle against the systemic odds. Portfolio investment 
encourages shareholder distancing and a focus on short term financial results rather than their 
active involvement in and stewardship of the corporation. So, trying to give them a more responsible 
role in corporate governance will, as Lorraine Talbot4 too points out, exacerbate the problems that 
flow from financialisation and corporate irresponsibility rather than solving them.  
The proposition we find here, then, is that reforms must be directed towards radical change in the 
structure and purpose of the corporation. Addressing the responsibilities of shareholders and 
managers without fundamentally questioning their relation to the firm is not enough. Instead, these 
reforms must start by challenging the fundamental proposition that shareholders have a claim to be 
the ‘owners’ of, or should have an owner-like status in, the corporation. A key structural problem is, 
as Ireland maintains, that the corporate legal form currently confers residual property rights on 
shareholders (especially the rights to receive a dividend and to appoint the board), but with few of 
the responsibilities that usually attach to such rights: 
‘Shareholders have been relieved, like creditors, of responsibility from corporate wrongs and 
debts, but permitted to retain residual proprietary rights which enable them to ensure that 
corporations are run in their exclusive interests.’5  
When these rights coexist alongside financial remuneration incentives for directors to increase 
profits and raise share prices, they generate a highly profit-oriented corporate culture. At the same 
time, directors can widely protect themselves against incurring a personal responsibility, not least by 
invoking specific leniency clauses in the corporate articles and/or extensive indemnity and insurance 
policies. The case for reform therefore arises directly out of the corporate legal personality which, as 
currently construed, confers many advantages on the corporation but establishes few personal 
responsibilities for shareholders or corporate executives.  
Related to this is the suggestion that the corporate form is itself a socially constructed organisation 
and is, as Martin Parker reminds us, ‘only one form of organising amongst many, many others’.6 Both 
                                                          
3 Ireland, above fn. *. 
4 Lorraine Talbot, ‘Why Shareholders Shouldn’t Vote’ 76 Modern Law Review (2013) 791. 
5 Ireland, above fn. *. 
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Parker and Ireland challenge the idea that that the corporation as we know it, with shareholder 
primacy operating at its heart, somehow entrenches, as a matter of necessity, how we should 
conduct business and trade. Instead, it is suggested that a more open and experimentalist 
intellectual attitude towards social and economic organisation is necessary to make business fit for 
our century, to tackle necessary corporate reforms and meet the global challenges we currently 
face. We have an intrinsic capability as humans to collectively shape our organisations and, as Colin 
Mayer points out, to ‘create concepts and institutions to assist rather than subjugate us.’7 This 
capability forces us to recognise that our organisational choices, including how we organise and 
legally construct the firm, remain fundamentally a matter determined by our politics. It must not be 
determined by a sense of ‘false necessity’, as Roberto Mangabeira Unger puts it,8 where existing 
organisations, especially the ones that dominate our social and economic lives so deeply as the 
corporation does, are understood to reflect some teleological imperative or natural law that 
determines our development or human nature. In short, the conceptual starting point here is that 
the corporate legal form is a social construct and a political choice rather than determined by any 
form of economic necessity. Choosing to radically reform corporations, or finding new ways of 
conducting business and trade, is equally a political matter. It must not be treated as somehow 
outside what is politically feasible or acceptable.9  
Existing and emerging alternatives: social enterprise, mission-led business, 
employee-ownership and cooperatives  
The existence, and ongoing emergence, of alternative forms of the business enterprise that differ 
fundamentally from the corporation in both structure and purpose, has become a more and more 
central theme in these critical debates on corporate governance reform. As suggested by Boeger and 
Villiers, by looking beyond the conventional corporate form, and taking inspiration from existing 
alternatives such as cooperatives and social enterprises, we might find lessons in those examples to 
identify new ways of organising business enterprises to benefit entrepreneurs and global society.10 
By studying these alternative forms, we may then be able to devise better organisational vehicles to 
enable us to open out both the structure and purpose of business to wider societal concerns, while 
ensuring their economic sustainability. In this way, we may not only provide an inspiration and 
impetus to progress toward corporate governance reform, but we may eventually be able to 
challenge the hegemony of the corporation itself as the (necessarily) most appropriate form of 
organising collective economic activity.11 At the same time, by looking at these alternatives, we may 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Martin Parker, Epilogue: necessity organisation and politics’, Nina Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds.), 
Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise diversity, Oxford: Hard Publishing, 
2017, forthcoming. 
7 Colin Mayer, Firm Commitment: why the corporation is failing us and how to restore trust in it, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013, p. 255.  
8 Roberto Unger, False Necessity: Anti-Necessitarian Social Theory in the Service of Radical Democracy, London: 
Verso, 2004. 
9 Parker, above fn. *. 
10 Nina Boeger and Charlotte Villers, ‘Introduction’, in idem, Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards 
corporate reform and enterprise diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017, forthcoming. 
11 In fact, practical trends are beginning to challenge that hegemony: see for example the rapid growth of 
limited liability companies in the US as an alternative to traditional corporations, as documented at 




identify a wider role for them in shaping capitalism today, even if many of them still currently 
operate in niche markets. 
Despite the focus in mainstream corporate scholarship and amongst most business practitioners on 
the conventional corporate form, there exists today a great diversity of formats globally that enable 
business enterprises to address concerns beyond maximising profit for shareholders. In fact, such is 
their diversity that it calls into question any purist claim that ‘doing good’ is something that will be 
left to non-profits while the (only) purpose of business is to ‘do well’ by making money. So many and 
so varied are their forms, that one of the key challenges today is defining common ground and a 
common language that will permit us to study their idiosyncratic features, draw comparisons and 
identify differences, but also to develop cross-cutting ideas and concepts that can define (new) legal 
and governance structures. Individual businesses’ demands and capacities will have to be carefully 
matched to the available legal and governance formats, and therefore, some diversity is 
advantageous, but it should not cloud the structural cohesion we need to develop workable 
organisational forms in this diverse and evolving corporate landscape.  
In the UK for example, we may consider at least four separate types to broadly classify existing 
alternative business forms: social enterprises, mission-led businesses, employee-owned firms and 
(more broadly) cooperatives. There are many overlapping aspects and blurred boundaries between 
these, and we cannot expect all alternative business organisations to neatly fit within one or other 
category, though mapping out these categories or types helps us in identifying certain themes and 
characteristics. In doing so, we should also adopt a critical lens, scanning these formats not only for 
their strengths and opportunities but equally for existing weaknesses, potential risks and unintended 
consequences. Aware of the limitations that the scope of a single chapter imposes on the task, this 
section presents an attempt at introducing the key features of those four types of alternative 
business forms, to offer an idea of their central features, key developments as well as challenges, 
including how they relate to one another.12 This is followed in the next section by a discussion of 
how our experience with these various forms might, both empirically and conceptually, help in 
shaping the debate on corporate reform.  
Social enterprise 
The first of these categories is what nominally defines this book: social enterprise. Although 
internationally the concept of social enterprise is contested and usually means, as Teasdale reminds 
us, ‘different things to different people across different contexts and at different points in time’,13 in 
the UK at least there exists a rough-and-ready consensus on its basic definition. Broadly, we 
understand social enterprises as firms that earn most of their income through trading, but that also 
commit themselves to a specific social and/or environmental purpose(s) and principally reinvest 
                                                          
12 There are further alternatives we could cover here, for example mutual and state-owned enterprises, but 
with a view towards the following debate, and given the constraints of this chapter, we focus on these four 
types. 
13 Simon Teasdale, ‘What’s in a name? The construction of social enterprise’, Third Sector Research Centre, 
Working Paper 46, 6 September 2010, available at: 
http://www.birmingham.ac.uk/generic/tsrc/documents/tsrc/working-papers/working-paper-46.pdf (accessed 
20 July 2017) 
6 
 
their surplus revenue to advance this/these purpose(s).14 Beyond this basic definition, social 
enterprises still feature a spectrum of governance options,15 varying in terms of their size and legal 
form, the intensity of their community engagement and extent of financial investment, as well as the 
volume of their commercial trade and proportion of income re-invested to progress their social 
purpose(s). Some operate locally, others nationally or even internationally.16 Some are longstanding 
businesses and other start-ups.  
One of the key concerns for many social enterprises is to ensure their social mission will endure and 
be ‘locked into’ the business, to prevent a for-profit sale of business assets and a disproportionate 
extraction of profits at any point in the future. Legal formats such as the community interest 
company17 or the community benefit society18 are available in the UK to impose an asset lock on the 
business, a constitutional device that prevents the distribution of residual assets to members and 
ensures that the community benefit of any retained surplus, or residual value, cannot be 
appropriated for the private benefit of its members.19 In addition, community interest companies 
that are set up as companies limited by shares are subject to a regulated dividend cap that is 
calculated chiefly as an aggregate limit on the total dividend declared. These provisions are primarily 
there to ensure that profits continue to be principally invested for the community benefit. But some 
social entrepreneurs are concerned that these commercial restrictions will put off investors,20 
including social impact investors, at a time when almost half of social enterprises in England 
continue to regard access to finance as a key barrier, or potential barrier, to attaining economic 
sustainability.21 These concerns are not new. Following calls within the sector to increase financial 
flexibility, in 2014 the legislator approved changes to loosen the original regime on dividends caps, 
and restrictions on performance-related leans, to establish the current, more flexible rules.22 
Following these legislative changes, social finance and investment in community interest companies 
appears to have grown in recent years.  
                                                          
14 Dan Gregory, ‘The Politics, Policy, Popular Perception and Practice of Social Enterprise in the 21st Century’, in 
Nina Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and 
enterprise diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2017, forthcoming. 
15 Rory Ridley-Duff and Mike Bull, Understanding Social Enterprise: Theory & Practice, 2nd edition, SAGE 
Publishing, 2015. 
16 Social Enterprise UK, State of Social Enterprise Survey 2015, available at: 
https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/Pages/Category/state-of-social-enterprise-reports (accessed 18 June 
2017) 
17 Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 and Community Interest Company 
Regulations 2005 (SI 2005/1788), as amended by the Community Interest Company (Amendment) Regulations 
2009 (SI 2009/1942) and Community Interest Companies (Amendment) Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/2483). 
18 Co-operative and Community Benefit Societies Act 2014. 
19 Office of the Regulator of Community Interest Companies, Community Interest Companies: Guidance 
Chapters, last updated April 2017, available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/community-
interest-companies-how-to-form-a-cic (accessed 2 May 2017). 
20 Stephen Lloyd, ‘Transcript: Creating the CIC’, Vermont Law Review 2010 (35)1, 31-44. 
21 Social Enterprise UK, State of Social Enterprise Survey 2015, available at: 
https://www.socialenterprise.org.uk/Pages/Category/state-of-social-enterprise-reports (accessed 18 June 
2017) 
22Nina Boeger, Sara Burgess and Julie Ellison, ‘The Community Interest Company’ in Nina Boeger and Charlotte 
Villiers (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and enterprise diversity, Oxford: 




The community interest company limited by shares, these days with fewer restrictions following the 
legislative amendments, embodies the more commercial aspect of this legal model. While still not as 
common as community interest company limited by guarantee, there is a modest upward trend in 
registrations of community interest companies limited by shares. The current trend suggests that 
this more commercial model may be gradually supplementing the more traditional hybrid format 
where the organisation behaves charitably and often focuses on grant income while having the 
responsibility of a private limited company. Social investment tax relief, introduced in the UK 2014, is 
also starting to attract interest from smaller investors who can achieve tax relief for their investment 
in a community interest company (and other asset locked models). It offers social enterprises access 
to “cheaper” capital, potentially without the risk of having to dilute ownership of their company. 
Many investors, and community interest companies themselves, are currently still uncertain about 
the nature of social investment tax relief, but there appears to be an appetite amongst community 
interest companies, and social enterprises generally, to develop their businesses more strategically, 
to grow commercially stronger and be more influential.  
Mission-led business 
Formats with significantly less commercial restrictions are available to firms wishing to set up as 
mission-led businesses. The UK government has defined these as enterprises that distribute their 
profits to shareholders and owners, but at the same time formulate an intention to have a positive 
social impact as a central purpose of their business. They make a long-term commitment to deliver 
on that intention, and regularly report on their social impact to their stakeholders.23 Rather than an 
asset lock and dividend cap, the procedural mechanism to protect the social or environmental 
purpose of these enterprises is more flexibly defined. While there is concern to “lock” the social 
mission into the business for some time – perhaps the foreseeable future - these models are 
generally designed to be more adaptable to the financial expectations of investors and therefore 
take a more relaxed attitude towards the future evolution of their business model.  One way of 
setting up a mission-led business, without going as far as locking-in assets or restricting dividend 
distribution, is to become a certified B Corporation or ‘B Corp’. The B Corp label, which will be more 
familiar to corporate lawyers in the US where it originated, arrived in the UK in 2015. It is not a legal 
format but a voluntary certification available to businesses upon application (and payment of a fee) 
to B Lab, an independent and internationally operating not-for-profit organisation. B Corp 
certification offers an independent assurance that a firm is committed, through its constitution and 
its governance, not just towards its shareholders but also towards its wider stakeholders and the 
environment. Amongst other things, the certification process involves an independent assessment of 
the business’ governance and overall impact on internal and external stakeholders (including 
workers, communities and the environment) at least every two years. It also requires the firm to 
include in its constitutional documents an objective to benefit shareholders and to have a positive 
                                                          
23 UK Government, Mission-led Business Review, Call for Evidence, May 2016, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/521927/Mission-
Led_Business_Review-Call_for_Evidence.PDF (accessed 2 May 2017); Advisory Panel’s Independent Report on 
the Review, On a Mission in the UK Economy, published in February 2017, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/574694/Advisory_Panel_Re
port_-_Mission-led_Business.pdf (accessed 2 May 2017). 
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impact on society and the environment,24 and to sign a declaration that sets out its commitment to 
its stakeholders and the environment.25 
The government recently commissioned an independent review of mission-led business that has 
given rise to wider debates, beyond the B Corp, about a more responsible form of business which, 
however, remains fully profit-distributing and commercially active. In its concluding report, the 
independent review panel describes it as an ‘ethos’ of mission-led businesses ‘to contribute 
positively to society through their operations, goods and services.’26 The report further states that 
there are currently around 123,000 mission-led businesses in the UK with an annual turnover of 
£165 billion, employing around 1.4 million people. It further estimates that ‘by 2026 all UK 
businesses will have a mission that includes serving society and the environment. The most 
successful businesses will be those that manifestly deliver on that mission.’27 These, as Hunter and 
Boeger observe, ‘might be surprising numbers given this is a new concept for many people’, and 
especially the estimate requires some careful interpretation, not only because of the ‘undeniable 
ambition of the word “all”’ but also because ‘“includes” could cover a vast spectrum of intent, not all 
of it benign to all stakeholders.’28 It is therefore still too early to predict what impact the report will 
eventually have; much depends on the government’s response to it, and whether there is any 
political traction to take its ideas seriously.  
However, the report itself has already provoked some critical reflection and debate, not least 
because it clearly chooses to define the social mission or ethos of a company primarily as a business 
case, arguing that it would make the company more successful economically and give it a 
‘competitive advantage’29 (for example, because it would impact on workforce morale and 
productivity, or on consumer satisfaction). This, and the panel’s additional focus on the ‘contribution 
to UK growth’30 by mission-led businesses, have raised concern as to whether this is genuinely 
seeking to reform the business enterprise or simply a re-branding exercise which, at its heart, 
remains concerned with growth and productivity. More particularly, there is concern that 
corporations may turn to the mission-led business label as a ‘brand’ rather than instigating 
fundamental changes to the corporate culture of their business. Could this, in other words, turn out 
to be merely a new iteration of CSR which, as Hunter and Boeger point out, could be ‘perhaps more 
dangerous if it is given legislative legitimacy and provides a further shield of apparent benign intent 
behind which corporates continue ‘business as usual’’?31 And further, will genuine, fully asset-
locked, social enterprises be able to maintain their market positions, and retain and even grow their 
access to affordable and sustainable finance, when fully-profit distributing businesses might brand 
                                                          
24 In the UK, this requires the adoption of a wording in the constituting document that repeats s. 172(1) of the 
Companies Act 2006 but with some ‘small but significant’ alterations to satisfy this legal test, according to 
David Hunter, ‘The Arrival of B Corps in Britain: another milestone towards a more nuanced economy?’ in Nina 
Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds.), Shaping the Corporate Landscape: towards corporate reform and 
enterprise diversity, Oxford: Hart Publishing, forthcoming, 2017. 
25 Available at https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/the-b-corp-declaration (accessed 2 May 2017). 
26 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above fn. *, p. 8. 
27 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above fn. *, p. 31 
28 David Hunter and Nina Boeger, What is the Point of Business?, University of Bristol Law School Blog, 
December 2016. 
29 On a Mission in the UK Economy, above fn.*, p. 5 
30On a Mission in the UK Economy, above fn. * p. 3.  




themselves - to consumers, to investors, to policymakers, to the public – as business with a social 
mission but without any guarantee that this mission is fully entrenched in the business?  
Employee-owned firms 
If the defining characteristic of social enterprises and mission-led businesses is their social purpose 
or mission, then employee-owned firms and cooperatives are distinct primarily because of their 
democratic ownership and governance structure. In practice though, these boundaries are of course 
not clear-cut. Cooperatives for example usually do have a defined purpose (they have been titled the 
‘original’ social enterprise), and many modern cooperatives would explicitly identify as a social 
enterprise. There are many employee-owned firms, on the other hand, that despite their distinct 
structure would not consider themselves a social enterprise.  
Employee-owned firms have been a part of the UK economy for decades, although they remain, 
comparatively speaking, a niche business form. Nonetheless, the UK’s Employee Ownership 
Association (EOA) considers employee ownership to be ‘significant and growing’, delivering currently 
4% of UK GDP annually.32 The advantages of employee-owned businesses, according to the 
Association, include ‘higher productivity and greater levels of innovation’ as well as ‘more engaged, 
more fulfilled and less stressed workforces’ and greater resilience to economic turbulence.33 
Empirical studies beyond the UK support these claims. A 1980s study of US Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) conducted by the US General Accounting Office, for example, found that 
‘the greater degree of employee participation in corporate decision making, the higher the rate of 
change in our measure of productivity between pre-ESOP and post-ESOP periods’.34 But – if there is 
a correlation between democratic decision-making and productivity, as identified, then why are 
there not more businesses controlled by their workers?  
Neoliberal economic theory suggests it is because employee ownership generates inefficiency, as 
Jensen and Meckling write: 
‘The fact that this system seldom arises out of voluntary arrangements among individuals 
strongly suggests that codetermination or industrial democracy is less efficient than the 
alternatives which grow up and survive in a competitive environment.’35   
David Erdal on the other hand, pointing towards the empirical evidence, argues that the real reason 
why employee ownership has remained a niche format and not gained a greater market share is not 
structural inefficiency but vested corporate interests: the conventional corporate form currently 
grants investors and directors extensive opportunities to extract financial wealth, and ‘an 
improvement which involves their giving up these benefits will be resisted strenuously.’36 Even 
where they could re-structure their companies to incorporate more democracy, they would usually 
choose not to because to do so would impinge on their personal financial opportunities.  
                                                          
32 http://employeeownership.co.uk/what-is-employee-ownership/ (accessed 27 July 2017). 
33 Ibid.  
34 General Accounting Office, Employee Stock Ownership Plans: little evidence of effects on corporate 
performance, Washington: GAO, www.gao.gov/assets/150/145909.pdf, p. 31. 
35 Michael Jensen and William Meckling, ‘Rights and Production Functions: an application to labor managed 
firms and codetermination’ 1979 Journal of Business 32, 469-506, 473.  
36 David Erdal, ‘Recognising Facts in Economic Democracy’, in Nina Boeger and Charlotte Villiers (eds.), Shaping 




Richard Wolff, similarly, rejects ‘claims that competition between capitalist and noncapitalist 
enterprises (including [employee-owned businesses]) necessarily must lead and always has led to 
the same result: dominance of the former and disappearance of the latter.’ Employee-owned 
enterprises are not, he argues, ‘somehow intrinsically unsuccessful competitors.’ 37 Instead, they will 
thrive when economic, political, and cultural conditions are conducive, and if they are supported by 
appropriate business strategies. However, Wolff also reminds us that employee ownership and 
democratic governance are themselves diverse business forms. Not all these forms are what he 
refers to as fully ‘worker-directed’ enterprises. ESOPs for example turn employees into corporate 
shareholders and give them related rights, for example to appoint directors. But Wolff points out 
that although they incorporate employees in this way, these enterprises are not conceptually 
different from the conventional corporate form. In fact, ESOPs feature in many mainstream 
corporations, including major FTSE 100 businesses,38 although they are sometimes unevenly 
distributed within the firm or easily reversible at the board’s discretion.39 Wolff himself instead 
makes the case for more radical democracy within the firm – what he terms a worker-self-directed 
enterprise. In such an enterprise, he explains,  
‘all of the workers who produce the surplus generated inside the enterprise function 
collectively to appropriate and distribute it…. They do this in conjunction – in a shared 
democratic decision-making process – with the surrounding communities at the local, 
regional and national levels.’40  
Cooperatives 
Some cooperatives could be considered ‘worker-directed’ enterprises (although Wolff considers 
them to be distinct forms), but not all coops are employee owned. More generally, cooperative 
enterprises are co-owned by those who participate in the business (their members) – which may be 
employees, or consumers, residents, tenants, a group of artists, taxi drivers, farmers, etc. - and they 
are democratically governed by their members.41 The cooperative tradition in Britain goes back to 
the mid-1800s, when the first cooperative in the town of Rochdale was established and set out what 
are today known globally as the seven cooperative principles: voluntary and open membership; 
democratic member control; members’ economic participation; autonomy and independence; 
education, training and information; cooperative among cooperatives; and concern for the 
community. These roots of the cooperative movement remain influential, although the variety of 
cooperative forms that exist in the British economy today has broadened out. Cooperatives UK for 
example, the largest cooperative membership association in Britain, tends to speak more generally 
of a ‘cooperative economy’ rather than a specific form of coop, and explains cooperatives very 
broadly as ‘organisations that give people ownership and control over the things that matter to 
                                                          
37 Richard Wolff, Democracy at Work: A cure for capitalism, Haymarket Books, 2012, p. 156. 
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Zamagni and Zamagni, Cooperative Enterprise: Facing the Challenge of Globalisation, Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2010. 
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them’.42 It also highlights that the UK economy features cooperatives in almost every sector, from 
banking and energy to food, health and housing, with cooperative enterprises ranging from local to 
large scale.43 The ‘cooperative society’ is a tailored legal form for cooperatives, but cooperative firms 
tend to choose whatever format meets their individual needs, incorporating variably as societies, 
partnerships and companies.  
As with employee ownership discussed above, studies suggest that cooperation can boost 
innovation and productivity as well as wider democratic engagement.44 There is market pressure on 
cooperatives to emulate standard corporate practices on pricing, wages and governance45 but, as 
Flecha and Ngai point out, it is possible to adapt strategic business growth to maintain the character 
of the cooperative enterprise.46 Still, despite an upward trend in cooperative membership, the UK’s 
cooperative economy only takes up a small proportion of the wider economy.47 Why, if there is a 
business case for cooperatives, are there not more of them? The arguments align to some extent 
with those around employee-ownership. One set of arguments considers the fact that the 
cooperative format is structurally (and therefore intrinsically) inefficient and therefore not 
economically viable or, as Jon Elster puts it simply, ‘that workers prefer working in capitalist firms.’48 
Elster however points out that these explanations are not necessarily correct, and other 
explanations might have to be considered:  
‘It could be that the isolated cooperative in an otherwise capitalist economy suffers 
difficulties that would not arise within a fully cooperative context. This could happen in four 
ways: by endogenous preference formation, adverse selection, discrimination, and 
externalities.’49 
To paraphrase these four arguments. For one, it may be that people do not choose cooperatives, 
quite simply because there are so few of them. Secondly, people who set up cooperatives tend to be 
reformers rather than skilled businessmen or -women. Further, in certain situations, cooperatives 
may be unfairly discriminated against (for example, they may struggle to satisfy requirements to 
access credit).  And finally, and most seriously of all, the fact that so few cooperatives exist (they are, 
                                                          
42 Cooperatives UK, The UK cooperative economy 2017, http://reports.uk.coop/economy2017/ (accessed 28 
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49 Ibid., p. 96 
12 
 
as Elster puts it, ‘isolated’) renders those that do exist more vulnerable to be affected by ‘the 
negative externalities created by capitalist firms’ – in particular, the availability of cheap labour – but 
also ‘by their failure to internalize positive externalities generated by themselves’ (for example, 
because there are few cooperatives to cooperate with).50 These are not insurmountable barriers, but 
neither are they negligible.  
Their members are traditionally the primary beneficiaries of cooperatives but cooperative forms 
have also historically been more strongly orientated towards community values than investor-
owned companies.51 The cooperative principles expressly integrate ‘concern for community’; and 
the international cooperative principles, formulated by the International Cooperative Alliance in 
1995, include a commitment to contribute to the sustainable development of the whole community. 
Many cooperative models therefore are also social enterprises, and boundaries between the two 
labels are further blurred as ‘social cooperatives’ commit their enterprise explicitly to a specific 
social venture.52  
A new and related development in the cooperative economy is the emergence of multi-stakeholder 
coops, including online ‘open platform’ cooperatives. The central idea behind this ‘new 
cooperativism’53 is to impart ‘more emphasis on shared return and solidarity between stakeholders, 
and it places less emphasis on meeting the needs of a single stakeholder’.54 As Ridley-Duff points 
out, whereas ‘old cooperativism’ confined discussion of a common bond (solidarity) to the social 
characteristics of a single stakeholder group (workers, consumers, producers etc.), new 
cooperativism assumes that, provided appropriate institutional arrangements are in place, solidarity 
can be forged between all these stakeholders.55 An example of this trend is a set of “FairShares” 
model articles of association, devised by Ridely-Duff and others. These offer firms wishing to set up 
as a limited company, association or society a constitutional template for creating a multi-
stakeholder cooperative enterprise, including a commitment to cooperative principles and a social 
or community purpose but also an opportunity to issue different types of shares to founders, 
investors, users and workers in the business, with democratically allocated voting rights (one person 
one vote). The central idea is to value different forms of investments in the firm, going beyond 
capital investment, so that ‘just as a financial investor gets back both their original capital plus a 
dividend, so an intellectual (labour) investor gets back both their original capital plus any dividend to 
which they are entitled’.56  
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Shaping the debate on corporate reform  
We have seen that, despite the dominance of the corporation, in the UK alone there is a great 
diversity of alternative types of business enterprises that appear to be operating more socially 
responsibly than most corporations currently do. Despite their diversity, what appears to unite these 
business forms is their commitment to generating value that is measured not as (short- or long-
term) financial return for shareholders, but defined in broader terms by taking account of the impact 
of the business, positively and negatively, on a wider set of stakeholders. Good performance 
generates value by maximising the positive impact on internal and external stakeholders while 
limiting negative impacts, with any trade-offs to be balanced against each other. This involves 
balancing the interests of various stakeholder groups, whom the business identifies, and who may 
be both internal to the business (investors, management and employees) and external, whether 
directly affected (e.g. consumers, suppliers, local communities, residents) or indirectly implicated 
(e.g. citizens in the welfare state, tax payers, the environment). These alternative corporate forms 
have built into their business different procedural mechanisms to ensure the commitment towards 
their stakeholders will be maintained in practice; such as, co-ownership and democratic governance 
in the cooperative and (some) employee-owned models, asset locks for most social enterprises or, 
more generally, a set of constitutional clauses to protect stakeholders, in the case of mission-led 
firms. Those procedural guarantees render these forms categorically different from conventional 
corporations, including those with voluntary CSR policies which are still ultimately committed to 
shareholder value. In this way, their governance provides some examples that may offer useful 
direction and impetus in the wider debate on corporate reform. The remainder of this section 
outlines an overview of some key contributions. These will be followed, in the final section, by a 
brief consideration of certain risks that we should bear in mind in developing inspiration from these 
alternatives.  
Ownership 
In the first instance, we may draw especially on cooperative models that point towards possibilities 
of revising and reforming corporate ownership rights. In the conventional corporate form, 
shareholders’ residual proprietary rights currently provide the central justification for the 
shareholder primacy model of corporate governance, and they are still widely used to justify the 
company directors’ role as agents for their shareholders with a primary obligation to maximise 
returns for shareholders as valued by share price. The co-ownership structures we find in 
cooperatives and in some forms of employee-ownership, on the other hand, directly challenge the 
central corporate idea that financial investors hold exclusive proprietary rights in the firm. In these 
alternative models, ownership in the enterprise is instead vested in all members (i.e. the participants 
in the business) in equal shares and in the case of multi-stakeholder cooperatives, these comprise 
several different stakeholder groups. Fairness and solidarity between members replace shareholder 
primacy as guiding norms, and ideas of shared and collaborative ownership supplement the 
existence of individual proprietary rights, for example where the constitution provides for pooling of 
resources and/or IT.57  
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Related to the debate over ownership, there exists today a widespread assumption that shareholder 
primacy, and the overriding duty for directors to maximise shareholder value, are derived directly 
from corporate law. These assumptions overstate the stringency of the law. In reality, as Sjåfjell 
reminds us, shareholder primacy remains a social norm rather than a strict legal obligation. 
Company laws mostly grant directors some flexibility to direct themselves towards a wider set of 
interests in the pursuit of their duty to promote the success of their company. 58 Thus, according to 
Sjåfjell:59 
‘Within the current system, company law on a comparative basis provides considerable 
latitude to the board, and by extension the management, to shape business in a sustainable 
manner. However, boards generally do not choose environmentally friendly, low carbon 
options within the realm of the business case, let alone challenge the other boundaries of 
the scope to pursue profit in a sustainable manner by going beyond the business case. This is 
because of the social norm of shareholder primacy’.  
The emergence of mission-led business appears to strengthen this view but it perhaps also signals an 
initial step towards a possible departure from, or at least a loosening of, the current assumptions 
around shareholder primacy in the corporate world. Mission-led businesses, we may recall, are 
defined as fully-profit-distributing corporate firms whose commitments, as we have seen with the B 
Corp certification option, are embedded in certain constitutional clauses. The fact that these exist 
today, without necessitating any specific legislative changes or reforms, suggests that it is in fact 
possible now to embed stakeholder interests in the corporate form by drafting constitutional 
documents in the appropriate manner. In other words, corporations are already free (and legally 
permitted) to act as mission-led businesses, and the fact that the vast majority of them (still) choose 
not to is not a matter of legal necessity, but a product of market forces and the individual business 
judgment of their directors. The recent surge in ‘B Corps’ and other forms of mission-led businesses 
in the UK, and the attention they have attracted, might imply that the tide on these issues could be 
starting to turn. However, ironically, these arguments have also come up as a criticism of the 
mission-led business ‘label’, on the basis that to brand these as somehow ‘new’ business forms is at 
best redundant, at worst misleading. In truth, it only reiterates what companies today can already, 
for the most part, legally achieve – but rarely choose to do.  
Pointing out this legal flexibility should not stop us from considering further legal reform; whether it 
by way of introducing new corporate legal formats (see, for example, the ‘Benefit Corporation’) or 
by making changes to the general corporate law. Sjåfjell herself suggests distinct changes to the 
provisions on directors’ duties to make, as she argues, corporations more sustainable and therefore 
‘fit for the 21st century’.60 However, as a starting point for our debate on legal reform, it is conducive 
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to recognise that the law does already embed progressive models within it; we “simply” need to 
strengthen and accentuate these progressive elements within the law.  
Corporate purpose 
One of the advantages, or perceived advantages, of the shareholder primacy model is its relative 
simplicity of pursuing a single goal (to maximise shareholder returns). Economic theorists suggest a 
single purpose model is efficient, avoiding difficulties for directors and investors in taking decisions 
where the interests of multiple stakeholders must be balanced. Instead, the idea is for wealth to be 
generated for shareholding elites that will eventually ‘trickle down’ to benefit everyone. We know 
today that the trickle-down effect is not happening, and instead wealth inequality is growing at pace. 
We also know that other externalities, especially environmental degradation, which have been 
aggravated as a result of the ‘single purpose’ approach to corporate governance, are not being 
addressed effectively by means of external regulation of corporate behaviour. Given these failures, 
we may turn directly to social (and mission-led) enterprises, and reconsider whether the more 
effective and sustainable model for corporate governance is in fact to embrace dual or multiple 
corporate purposes and responsibility to multiple stakeholders.  
Social enterprises are, in their very essence, a form of ‘blended enterprise’ with a wealth of 
experience in serving multiple masters. Doubtless, this feature brings considerable challenges, as 
Brakman Reiser points out: 61   
‘Blended enterprises at times will pursue more profits over more social good, and at times 
will pursue more social good over more profit…. Thus, achieving and governing truly blended 
enterprise means consistently serving two masters which is notoriously difficult.’ 
But social enterprise proponents would argue that their dual (or multiple) purpose, and their 
responsibility towards multiple stakeholders, have not been an unsurmountable barrier for new 
business forms to establish themselves and grow, provided adequate structural support (including 
sufficiently adaptable legal forms and accessible financial instruments) and the necessary 
entrepreneurial leadership are in place. Much depends, Marjorie Kelly argues, on establishing an 
alternative corporate culture that centres on solidarity and ‘generative’ rather than ‘extractive’ 
wealth; in other words, moving from a corporate focus on extracting maximum amounts of financial 
wealth, towards one whose ‘aim is to generate the conditions for our common life to flourish’.62 At 
the very least, as David Hunter points out, blended forms of enterprise underscore how the pursuit 
of profits to the exclusion of all else is ultimately self-defeating for corporations. Giving them instead 
a wider purpose, potentially provides the moderating effect necessary to prevent capitalism from 
sowing the seeds of its own collapse.63 
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Corporations are typically managed as hierarchical structures. Even where flatter, networked 
decision-making structures have been introduced (Google is an oft-cited example), the principle of 
competition tends to dominate their internal management as much as it defines their external 
operation on the market place. Hierarchy, or more generally differentiation of wealth and income 
(and status) in the corporate firm, are usually justified, as Martin Parker reminds us, by an 
assumption that ‘substantial pay differentials are required in order to attract and retain talent’.64 
They are used as drivers for efficiency, productivity and accountability and, arguably, greater morale 
but, as Charlotte Villiers remarks, they also result in ‘a less beneficent culture’ within the corporation 
and give rise to many of the cost cutting measures that impact (negatively) on corporate social 
responsibility.65  
By contrast, the governance of many alternative business forms, especially of social enterprises and 
cooperatives, is neither intrinsically competitive, nor do they rely on differentiation as a motivator in 
the same way that most conventional corporations do. There are for example nowhere near the 
same levels of distributional inequalities between top managers in workers in social or cooperative 
enterprises as we find in conventional businesses, especially in large corporations. Instead, there are 
many useful examples of organisations whose governance structure differs fundamentally from the 
corporation because it relies less on individualistic motives and more on the relational principles of 
care, compassion and cooperation. In social enterprises, they usually derive from the commitment of 
staff towards a social mission, and to others in the business (and the wider social enterprise 
community) who share the same or similar commitments. In cooperatives, these features derive 
directly from their character as membership-based organisations, and their commitment to 
democratic governance and horizontally shared decision-making structures. Cooperative forms give 
their members more rights than corporate shareholders: each member enjoys an equal say in the 
organisation (one person, one vote) and, as owners, all members not only share equally in all the 
profits (avoiding the problem of unequal rewards) but they are also more involved in collective 
decisions and business practices. The equality in their membership rights also affects the governance 
of the firm: decision-making is more horizontally organised and evenly distributed across members.66 
Beware the glorification of the activist entrepreneur  
These are promising connections that suggest we may draw on insights from alternative business 
forms, including social enterprises, cooperatives, mission-led and employee-owned firms, to develop 
our understanding of the opportunities for transforming the governance of the business corporation 
towards a more socially responsible form. We may go a little further in considering their (positive) 
impact. Behind these alternatives, a strong social movement appears to have developed that relies 
on individual entrepreneurs, or groups, to exercise their economic freedom – more particularly, their 
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autonomy to set up a business and engage in economic activities – for activist means.67 The purpose 
of their activism is to set up business organisations that, in their various forms, are both 
economically sustainable but also more socially responsible than the conventional business 
corporation, be it in a more directed way (set up for a specific social etc. purpose) or in a broader 
sense (committed to take account of stakeholders’ interests more widely). Either way, their setting 
up and their operation challenges the existing liberal market order and its underlying ideology.  
Achieving wider corporate reform may not be the express or immediate purpose of all alternative 
business enterprises (although the B Corp’s slogan – “B the Change” – suggests that some of them 
certainly will brand themselves in this way). But in any case, the motivations that drive them, and 
the structures that hold them, indirectly contribute towards the case for reforming the conventional 
corporate form, precisely because they manifest viable alternatives (in terms of ownership, duties, 
purpose and decision-making) to that form. The more they succeed, the more they put the failures 
of the corporation into relief. Eventually, their successes may begin to loosen too the stronghold 
that the corporate form (being the standard form) holds over our normative assumptions for 
business – that scale improves efficiency; extractive wealth, and wealth differentials, are perfectly 
legitimate; hierarchy acceptable; shareholder maximisation and overriding duty; and so on.68 And at 
that point, we may begin to have a genuine political discussion that weighs the advantages and 
drawbacks of various business forms that is not fundamentally dominated (and distorted) by the 
existing power of the business corporation and neoliberal economic theory. 
But at the same time, we must beware of the risk of glorifying the activist entrepreneur and the idea 
that business can and must operate as a force for good because these ideas may, ultimately, lead us 
once more to cede too much power to the business enterprise over crucial social, political and 
economic choices. People become activist entrepreneurs for different individual reasons – to change 
their careers, annoy their parents, impress their friends, make the world a better place, and so on. 
For most, these decisions involve a process of deep reflection that results in their resolve to take 
responsibility for some form of social change, and to use their entrepreneurial creativity to do so. 
They are therefore mostly very motivated individuals or groups with a certain social vision or passion 
and a sense of purpose. But they are still business entrepreneurs – in fact many of them are 
particularly “hands on” entrepreneurs precisely because they have a strong social, environmental 
etc. commitment to drive their business as a “force for good”. For example, many social enterprises 
choose to keep a small board that will help directors (often the business owners), keep their focus 
on the enterprise’s mission as well as ensure quick, purposeful decision making.69 In many of these 
organisations, therefore, decisions that concern the interests of stakeholders and their balancing vis-
à-vis one another are left broadly in the hands of directors and business owners who may be 
committed to engaging with relevant stakeholders, but who, ultimately, will retain power over key 
decisions.  
This, we may consider, is how a social business can be most efficiently managed. And many of these 
organisations will be highly effective and innovative in developing entrepreneurial responses to 
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social concerns. However, leaving these responses at the behest of a social entrepreneur or a 
management board potentially feeds a beast that is all too well-known in conventional corporate 
structures: the overpowering voice of the corporate director-manager who will, eventually, take the 
“right” decision for all in the firm. But because these are now acting as social entrepreneurs, a 
trustworthiness may be implied that is genuinely dangerous for our democratic societies: it implies 
that we may “trust” socially responsible business entrepreneurs in addressing some of the most 
pressing social and environmental concerns of our time – ‘relax, I’m a good guy’. Our focus in 
shaping corporate reform therefore must not be drawn exclusively, or primarily, towards the 
purpose or mission of business. The important other, complementary challenge is to incorporate 
genuinely democratic elements in our firms: stakeholder accountability, democratic (or cooperative) 
decision-making, horizontal structures and shared, and genuinely ‘generative’, ownership. It is 
necessary to avoid a situation where, by encouraging social enterprise and socially responsible 
business, we may end up augmenting corporate power but without guaranteeing our societies (and 
their various stakeholders) ultimate control over it.  
This suggest we need to reinforce specific reforms to ensure the democratic governance of our 
corporations and other business forms, in addition to developing a wider (social) mission for 
business. We need to, as I have argued elsewhere, ensure that the voices that are heard really do 
embed the interests of society in the firm.70 Cooperative forms and ‘worker-directed’ enterprises as 
Richard Wolff has modelled them, therefore have a fundamental place in directing the trajectory for 
developing (more) socially responsible business forms. But these concerns also force us to 
reconsider how business models will guarantee that their accountability towards their stakeholders 
is impactful, including effective mechanisms for enforcement. Social impact reporting and 
accounting provides one tool to improve both transparency and accountability. In terms of 
transparency it is important to ensure that businesses are required to report the full impact of the 
business’ activities rather than focus on financial results. Further, to guarantee genuine 
accountability, Stuart Cooper argues that ‘it is not sufficient for accountors to provide transparent 
and good information quality information to accountees.’ In addition, stakeholders must be able to 
‘enter into a discussion with the corporation’s management and other stakeholders’ and, most 
importantly, through these discussions they must be given the power to ‘influence decisions’. 
Without power to change corporate behaviour, accountability (as well as transparency), remains an 
empty promise.71  
But even where stakeholder accountability is embedded in the business constitution, it merits a 
closer look. For example, inclusion of stakeholder concerns in the constitutional object clause of a 
mission-led business will certainly enable directors on occasion to depart from their usual focus on 
shareholder value. But without offering these stakeholders an express route (judicial or else) of 
enforcing their right to be considered, these objects, even though they may be enshrined in the 
constitution of the business, remain potentially ineffective and marginal. Importantly, they provide 
for accountability to stakeholders only at the behest of directors and shareholders (who may hold 
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directors to account). These are arguments which the B Corp certification currently still has not 
formulated conclusive answers to. The process currently requires a modification of companies’ 
constitutional documents but without guaranteeing stakeholders any form of redress. In the UK for 
example, the relevant constitutional text includes a specific disclaimer that none of the relevant 
constitutional provisions will be ‘intended to or shall create or grant any right or any cause of action 
to, by or for any person (other than the Company)’.72 Hardly an assurance for stakeholders that they 
will be able effectively to hold the company to account. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has made the argument that enterprise diversity can and should be a driver for change 
in the ongoing critical debate on corporate reform. Identifying alternative forms of the business 
enterprise – including social enterprises, cooperatives, mission-led and employee-owned firm – and 
the diversity of legal and governance models they entail, can help develop corporate reforms that 
nurture how corporations can do good (and well), tackling the global challenges for which they are 
currently, in large measure, responsible. The chapter outlined four areas – ownership, directors’ 
duties, corporate purpose and decision-making - where alternative business forms currently provide 
some impetus for structural changes to the corporate form. As a theme, the need for further 
democratisation of our corporations runs through all of these. And why should we be surprised? As 
much as we take pride in our political democracies, we have widely neglected this feature in our 
business corporations including (and especially) those operating as large multinational enterprises. 
Yet, the corporation is the one institution that, as Colin Mayer remarks, ‘has the opportunity to 
transform our lives around the world even further’.73 By focusing on developing democracy in all our 
businesses, we can unlock this potential but avoid the pitfall that I have referred to as the 
‘glorification of the activist entrepreneur’. As much as we need strong leadership from enterprising 
individuals, sustainable corporate reform is about how to better reflect our collective choices, as a 
society, in the business enterprise.   
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